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Pursuant to directions of the court made at oral argument, 
cross-claim defendant and respondent Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
(SCM) submits herewith the following supplemental brief as to the 
issue of this court's jurisdiction of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The jurisdictional issue raised by the court makes it 
necessary to review the factual background by which Banberry's 
cross-claim against SCM was bifurcated from the trial of the main 
case. 
The action was commenced as a foreclosure action initiated 
by plaintiffs July 21, 1983. (R. 1) Cross-defendant SCM was not 
impleaded as a cross-defendant until February, 1984, some eight 
months after the commencement of the original action, and after a 
considerable amount of discovery had taken place. (R. 596) SCM 
attacked the cross-claim by a motion to dismiss on the grounds: 
1) That the cross-claim was filed without obtaining an order of 
the court granting leave to implead SCM as required by Rule 13(g); 
2) that SCM was not a party whose presence was necessary for the 
granting of complete relief in the determination of any pending 
counterclaim or cross-claim; and 3) that the cross-claim did not 
state a claim as against SCM upon which relief could be granted. 
(R. 937-938) 
The motion was heard by Judge Fishier on June 4, 1984. At 
that time the court, by minute entry denied the motion, but, on 
its own motion ordered that the issues against SCM should be tried 
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first. Those issues were delineated as: 1) Did the trustee have 
a duty to anyone other than Kimball? 2) If so, was such duty 
breached? 3) Was it malicious? and 4) Is there agency between 
Kimball, Garner and the law firm? 
Although the appellants designated the order denying the 
motion to be included in the record on appeal, neither the Court's 
minute order, nor the subsequently entered formal order were 
included in the record on appeal. See appellant's designation of 
record on appeal, Item No. 28. (R. 1430) These items should be 
included in the record between pages 1007 and 102 0. For the 
convenience of the Court, copies of both orders are attached. The 
subsequently entered formal order, prepared by counsel for 
Banberry, provided in paragraph 2 as follows: 
The factual issues raised by the Crossclaim of 
Banberry Crossing, et al against Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau are bifurcated and will be tried 
separately before the trial of the main action. The 
issue of agency between Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau and Eugene L. Kimball will be tried and 
the determination of that issue will be binding and 
conclusive on all parties at the trial of the main 
action. The issue of damages will not be tried, but 
will be reserved for trial at the trial of the main 
action. 
(Emphasis added.) The first sentence of paragraph 3 provided as 
follows: 
Further proceedings in this action are stayed 
until the trial of the foregoing issues between 
Banberry Crossing, et al and Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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There is no reference to Rule 21 in either the court's 
minute entry or the formal order incorporating the ruling of the 
court. Neither is the language of Rule 21 incorporated either in 
the minute entry or in the formal order. 
Pursuant to the foregoing order, the issues bifurcated for 
separate trial were tried before Judge Dee in September, 1984, 
resulting in a directed verdict in favor of SCM on all issues. 
(Tr. Vol. V, pp. 90-125) Judgment was entered on the directed 
verdict. (R. 1242-1243) The judgment recites that, "the cross-
claims . . . against cross defendant Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, having been previously bifurcated for trial . . .If 
(Emphasis added.) Banberry then initiated this appeal without 
obtaining the certificate required by Rule 54(b). (R. 1331) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent disputes each of the contentions advanced by 
appellants and urges: 
(1) That Rule 54(b) is applicable to this case since the 
order of bifurcation by Judge Fishier was not an order of 
severance under Rule 21. 
(2) That appellants1 failure to comply with Rule 54(b) was 
a jurisdictional defect requiring a dismissal of their appeal. 
(3) That alternatively, if the appeal is not dismissed, it 
should be consolidated with the other appeal from the same case, 
with leave to both parties to file amended briefs. 
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ARGUMENT 
Respondent addresses the arguments advanced by appellants 
seriatim. 
POINT I; RULE 54(b) IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Appellants appear to argue that the order of bifurcation 
entered by Judge Fishier was an order of severance as provided by 
Rule 21. However, Rule 21 is not mentioned in either the minute 
entry or the formal order of the court. The order does not speak 
in terms of "a severance of claims," but of a "bifurcation of 
issues." The fact that the trial of the claim against SCM was not 
intended to be separated as an independent, discrete action is 
clearly indicated by the order of the court limiting the specific 
issues to be tried in that proceeding; providing that all parties 
shall be bound by the findings on the issues bifurcated for trial; 
specifically reserving the issue of damages for trial with the 
main case; and staying all discovery proceedings in the main case 
pending trial of the bifurcated issues. 
Appellants cite and rely upon Spencer, White & Prentiss, 
Inc. of Connecticut v. Pfizer, Inc., 498 F.2d 358 (2nd Cir. 1974), 
and United States v. O'Neil. 709 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1983). It is 
difficult to understand what comfort appellants derive from 
Spencer, White & Prentiss, etc. since that case resulted in a 
dismissal of the appeal. The complex and confusing verbiage of 
that decision is difficult to penetrate, but it is clear that the 
court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants 
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apparently take comfort from some dicta to the effect that an 
appeal from a judgment on a validly severed single claim may be 
taken as of right, notwithstanding the pendency of other claims. 
Respondents do not dispute that rule. However, it has no 
application here since, as above noted, this is not a separate 
case under Rule 21. United States v. O'Neil, supra, recognized 
the difference between separate trials under Rule 42(b) and a 
severance resulting in discrete independent suits under Rule 21. 
As heretofore noted, this was not a severed case under Rule 21. 
It follows, therefore, that Rule 54(b) is applicable. 
POINT II: COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 54(b) IS 
JURISDICTIONAL AND FAILURE TO COMPLY SHOULD RESULT 
IN DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL. 
This court has impliedly held that a Rule 54(b) certificate 
is jurisdictional to an appeal from a judgment which adjudicates 
some, but less than all, of the pending claims against one or more 
parties. In Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 
1984), this court, speaking unanimously through Justice Zimmerman, 
said at pages 768-9: 
The order below wholly disposed of a claim or a 
party and may be termed •final1 for Rule 54(b) 
purposes. However, the trial court has not directed 
entry of a final judgment on the claim dismissed, 
nor has it certified that no just reason exists for 
delaying the appeal. Absent such a judgment and 
certification, we cannot entertain the appeal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has held that the requirements of Rule 54(b) are jurisdictional 
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rather than discretionary. See Clark v. United States of America, 
624 F.2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
Appellants cite, quote and rely upon Anderson v. Allstate 
Insurance Company, 630 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980), Gillis v. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 
1985), and Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Company, 764 F.2d 
252 (5th Cir. 1985). The significant difference between those 
cases and the case at bar is that in those cases all other issues 
had been resolved in the court below, and therefore, the appellate 
court was not confronted with piecemeal appeals. That is not the 
situation here. Although all issues of this case have now been 
tried, this court is now confronted with one of the very problems 
that Rule 54(b) was designed to avoid, namely, piecemeal appeals. 
In Anderson, the action was originally commenced in the 
state court and was removed to the federal court by all 
defendants. Three of the defendants brought motions to dismiss 
for failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted by reason of lapse of the statutory period of 
limitations. The motions were granted. Plaintiffs appealed from 
the order of dismissal without obtaining a Rule 54(b) certificate. 
Subsequently, the trial judge ordered remand of the remaining 
claims to the state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. Thus, 
there was nothing left for the trial court to decide at the time 
the appeal reached the Court of Appeals. The court held that 
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under tine circumstances of tiiaf case t Dat 11 would entertain 
jurisdiction, saying at 630 F.2d 681: 
There is no danger of piecemeal appeal confronting 
us if we find jurisdiction here, for nothing else 
remains in the federal courts. We therefore find 
that we have jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added,) That language was quoted, in partr with 
approval in Sandidge, 764 F.2d 255. Likewise in Gillis, it was 
made to appear .-•• argument that none of the individual 
hospital c-r"- ':•«*••. • - ••• the case A 1 though not condoning 
the "plaintiffs1 sloppy practice," the court concluded that under 
the circumstances of that case it had jurisdiction to consider the 
appeal on the iie 
Certification under Rule 54(b) is a matter of discretion 
with the trial judge. Rule ,M 54(b) orders should not be entered 
routinely 03 : as a coi ixtesy or accoirimociat, on to oounse.„., f Unless 
. . . there is some factor or factors that balance the scales in 
favor of certification, the court may properly conclude against 
certification. Certification will tend to Increase the number, ot 
appeals In the action. .
 f Successive appeals may . . force 
an appellate court to retraverse much of the same ground gone over 
on an earlier appeal; and the court may be able to <ii a better p b 
if the case conies to if: as one tract rather than a series of small 
plots." 6 Moore's Federal Practice, p 54.41[3], page 744. 
Here the court is confronted with two separate appeal s from 
the same case, one of which has reached and passed the stage of 
oral argument, and the other of which is still in the briefing 
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stage. This well illustrates the reasons behind Rule 54(b); the 
reason that the issuance of a certificate is discretionary with 
the trial court; and the reason that failure to comply with Rule 
54(b) should result in dismissal of the appeal. 
POINT III: THIS COURT SHOULD EITHER DISMISS THE 
APPEAL OR ORDER IT CONSOLIDATED WITH THE SECOND 
APPEAL NOW PENDING BEFORE IT. 
If a Rule 54(b) certificate is jurisdictional as held by 
the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, and as impliedly held 
by this court in Pate, this appeal should be dismissed. The 
subsequent trial and determination of the other issues remaining 
in this case would not and could not cure the defect of failure to 
obtain a Rule 54(b) certificate, and the purported appeal is a 
nullity. 
If this court determines that the appeal has been validated 
by the subsequent trial, in line with the holdings of the cases 
cited in appellants' brief under Point II, this appeal should be 
consolidated with the other appeal now pending. However, in view 
of the fact that the second trial may have mooted some of the 
issues raised by appellants on this appeal, if this appeal is 
consolidated with the other appeal now pending, both parties 
should be permitted to supplement or rewrite their briefs to bring 
to the attention of the court events which occurred in the second 
trial, and documents which are part of the record on appeal, to 
the extent that they may bear upon the issues raised by appellants 
in this appeal. This is a procedure suggested in Aleut Tribe v. 
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United States, 7 0*! Y A;I mri (i9H5")r cited by appellants at p, 12 
of their brief. 
CONCLUSION 
'This i.b not a ca^e of severance ct claims, under Rule 21 
and, therefore, Rule 54(b) is clearly applicable. Appellants 
failed to comply with that rule and their appeal, therefore, is a 
nullity, and shcu'ld be dismissed. If the court determines that 
the appeal was validated by the subsequent trial of the remaining 
issues, this appeal should be consolidated with the second appeal, 
with leave to both parties to submit amended briefs, bringing to 
the attention of; the court such matters and things contained in 
the record on the second appeal as may bear on the issues raised 
by appellants in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 6 £7T day of January, 1988. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELi . F-J. 
Bv / ^u//:i - C-tc u^-'tC ii-1\ . . ---
Ray R. Christensen 
Attorneys for Respondent Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau 
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Michael A. Katz 
GARRETT & STURDY 
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FILE NO. 7^57 
AUG 9 \M 
TP. L£: (V PARTIES ARTSTNTF 
F i r s t Secur i ty Bank of Utah, et a l 
vs 
Banberry Crossing, et a i 
& 
Keith Garner, et ' a l 
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^Edward M. Ga r r e t t 
^ a y R. Chr i s t ens en, P h i l l i p S. Ferguson 
Joye D. Ovard 
Sharyn Kelly 
LaMarr Gunn 
CLERK HON. P h i l i p R. F i s h i e r 
REPORTER DATE: June 4, 1984 
BAILIFF 
JUDGE 
This case comes now on for hearing DEFENDANT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & hARTINEAU'S MOTION TU DIS-
MISS (cont'd from 5-21-84) k DEFENDANTS BANBERRY CROSSING, BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CuRrOHATIoN, 
SCANDIA INVESTMENT CO., HILLCREST INVESTMENT CO., SIDNEY M. HORMAN, CHARLES H, HuRhAN & h. 
GORDON JOHNSONS MOTION-TO DiSMISS. 
James Byers from the California Bar Is appearing tor Kimball 
Defendant Snow, Christensen & Martlneau*s motion to dismiss is presented, argued and sub-
for leave 
xiitted. Counsel stipulate that a more appropriate motion to hear today would be a motion/to 
join Snow Christensen & Martlneau as Co-Defendants. Court agrees to hear argument on same 
ind indicates the, issue to address is whether they are lndispensible or not, 
Court indicates the Issues against Snow, Christensen, & Martlneau should be tried first, 
'he issues as he sees them are:(l) Did Trustee Castleton owe duty to anyone other than Kim-
tall. (2) If he did, was it breached (Breach of Duty). (3) Was it with malace. & (4) Is 
here agency between Kimball, Garner and the Law Firm. 
Court instructs Mr. Garrett to prepare the order granting motion for leave to join Snow, 
hristensen? and Martlneau and also re bifricating issues re 2.9 or have it approved by op-
3slng Counsel first. Court also stays all other discovery until this is ruled on. 
PAGE. .Of. 
Edward M. Garrett 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
Attorneys for Defendants Banberry Crossing, 
Banberry Development Corporation, Scandia 
Investment Company, Hillcrest Investment 
Company, Sidney M. Horman, Charles H. 
Horman, and M. Gordon Johnson 
311 South State Street 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2707 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, ] 
N.A., and FIRST SECURITY ] 
FINANCIAL, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
BANBERRY CROSSING, a Utah j 
partnership; BANBERRY ] 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, <i ] 
Utah corporation; SCANDIA : 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
general partnership; ] 
HILLCREST INVESTMENT COMPANY, ] 
a general partnership; ) 
GREGORY P. NELSON; VICTOR L. ] 
FOWLER; JACK J. JOHNSON; JOHN ] 
E. PRICE; SIDNEY M. HORMAN; ) 
CHARLES H. HORMAN; M. GORDON ) 
JOHNSON; EUGENE L. KIMBALL; 
WESTERN WOODLANDS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. ] 
and ] 
KEITH GARNER ' ad SNOW, ] 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, a ] 
partnership, ] 
i ORDER 
) Judge Philip R. Fishier 
) Civil No. 7457 
Crossclaim Defendants. 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau came on for hearing before the undersigned June 4, 
1984 Crossclaim Defendant Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
was represented by Ray R. Christensen, Defendant Eugene 1 
Kimball was represented by James Beyers, and Defendants 
Banberry Crossing, Banberry Development Corporation, Scandia 
Investment Company, Hillcrest Investment Company, Sidney M. 
Horman, Charles H. Horman, and M. Gordon Johnson were 
represented by Edward M. Garrett• 
Tlus Court having heard the arguments and statements of 
counsel concerning the Motion and other matter* makes 
and enters the following Order: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau is denied. 
2. The factual issues raised by *-K- •'Crossclaim of 
Banberry Crossing, et al against Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau are bifurcated and will be tried separately before 
the trial of the main action. The issue of agency between 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau and Eugene L. Kimball will be 
tried and the determination of that issue will be binding 
and conclusive on all parties at the trial of the main 
action. The issue of damages will not be tried, but will be 
reserved for trial at the trial of the main action. 
3. Further proceedings in this action are stayed until 
the trial of the foregoing issues between Banberry Crossing, 
et al and Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Provided, however, 
discovery by all parties, limited to Interrogatories and 
2 
Requests for Production of Documents, may continue. Discov-
ery shall not be limited in any manner on the issues between 
Banberry Crossing, et al and Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
and Eugene L. Kimball and Keith Garner on the issue of 
agency. Discovery on these issues must be completed by 
August 15, 1984. 
4. Leave of Court is granted to Defendant Eugene L. 
Kimball and Crossclaim Defendant Keith Garnei .-.s 
Cross-Defendants, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, 
Summit County Title Company, and Don Hutchinson. Defendants 
Banberry Crossing, et al are granted leave ,;u ,? r *ss-
claim against said Cross-Defendants. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
By 
Ray R. Christensen 
MISURACA, BEYERS & COSTIN 
By 
James L. Beyers 
3 
